Tom Barry Read online

  Jim O’Sullivan’s nieces, Joan and Margaret, grew up with the story from participants that ‘he heard the surrender’ got up and was fatally wounded. ‘We never heard anything, ever, only that they were tricked by the false surrender,’ Joan recalls. (In 1956, Jim’s brother, Con, while on a visit home from Chicago, put the iron cross at the No. 2 section spot.)[35]

  Louis Whyte who has been involved in the Kilmichael commemoration committee said, ‘we listened to the men over the years as they talked about Kilmichael and they always talked about the false surrender. In fact some of them blamed themselves because those other lads were killed … they talked after funerals, at functions, gatherings, after Mass. We listened to them in groups, when they were off their guard as it were, and they never talked down the false surrender. It was a fact. I stand over that.’[36]

  Dómhnall MacGiolla Phoil who was involved with Tom Barry and other survivors in the formation of the Kilmichael commemoration committee ‘never, never heard any of them disputing the fact that there was a false surrender. All over the years, since I knew these men in the early 1960s, it was in their story of the Kilmichael ambush. There was no need to doubt them. In fact I grew up knowing it.’[37]

  Seán Kelleher, also involved with Barry and participants in organising the Kilmichael commemoration events over the years, was adamant ‘that those lads were wronged by that deceitful false surrender. We went over this so many times!’[38]

  Pádraig Long as ‘a schoolboy in December 1920s recalled the teacher who described ‘the incident’ of the ‘Auxies’ who ‘threw down their rifles’ shouted ‘we surrender’ and the subsequent Volunteers’ acceptance – and the resumption of ‘firing’. Twelve-year-old-Johanna Hallahan can vividly recall the local anger at the deception of the Auxies with their false surrender tactics.[39]

  There is no doubt but the Kilmichael ambush was, as Barry said, ‘a vicious battle, a bloody battle ... it was probably the bloodiest fight in Ireland.’ He accepted full responsibility for his order to resume the fight after the surrender was falsified.[40]Standing on the Kilmichael site in the 1960s for a television programme he said, ‘It was a bloody fight. It was a bitter fight. It was a savage fight.’[41]For as long as they lived, those who fought in the Kilmichael ambush, while left with a vivid memory, could and did recall its awfulness. Faced with imminent death in such a horrific fashion ‘all senses are in a pretty sharp state’ and ‘memory is likely to be least faulty’ due to such an indelible print created by the circumstances.[42]Because of the death of comrades, Barry’s lifetime regret of not having warned his men of ‘the false surrender’ trick was mitigated slightly in the knowledge that because of their lack of fighting experience he had placed them in the best military positions. ‘There are no good or bad shots at ten yards range!’ he wrote.[43]

  In 1938 when the Irish Press photographer asked Tom Barry to assemble the survivors of Kilmichael, many came who had not participated in that ambush. ‘Barry wasn’t long putting the run on them’.[44]

  In a television interview, 1969, Barry sat in the studio with the survivors of the Kilmichael ambush and other men of the flying column. Speaking of ‘the bloodiest fight in Ireland’ he said, ‘I for one would have been satisfied to lose 10 men ... These men [the Volunteers] did not relish close fighting. It was hardly a fair battle to put men who had no real experience in battle against men who were commissioned ... It was a test of endurance. In guerrilla warfare the element of surprise and mobility are all important.’[45]

  ‘The fight was planned and carried out on the basis that the IRA would be well satisfied to lose man for man in smashing the Auxiliaries, for the nation’s morale could not for long be maintained were its citizens to be killed off without an armed challenge’, Barry wrote in 1941.[46]

  Speaking on a television interview from the ambush site at Kilmichael in the 1960s he was emphatic about the false surrender and his responsibility for the subsequent action of the column.[47]‘I blame myself for our losses, because I should have seen through the false surrender trick’, he told Kenneth Griffith.[48]

  In an RTÉ Radio interview with Nollaig Ó Gadhra, in 1969 about various aspects of his life, he talked about Kilmichael and when the interviewer was moving on to something else Barry drew him back: ‘Only for the false surrender, I would never forgive them for that!’[49]

  Dave O’Sullivan in a home video off-the-cuff discussion on Kilmichael asked, ‘were you ruthless?’

  ‘I wasn’t ruthless then. They killed two of my men with a false surrender and we wiped them out then. Afterwards we knew what to expect’.[50]

  In December 1974, responding to the implication that men were attacked when dead, Barry called it a ‘despicable suggestion that I attacked a dead man’.[51]

  The RTÉ drama department intended making a film on the Kilmichael ambush, so in 1979 Mr Haines ‘travelled’ the Kilmichael ambush area with Tom Barry. Though Barry was favourable to the presentation he had great reservations and sent a hand-written letter to Dan Nolan, his publisher at Anvil Press:

  You will recollect the British propaganda machine announced to the world that we had not alone massacred Cadets but we had mutilated their dead bodies with axes and hatchets. This dam (sic) lie was even partially contradicted by their own communiqué when they had to give the names of their dead Cadets with their ranks from Captains to Lieutenant-Colonel and their World War 1 decorations. They were of course, killed as I wrote in Guerilla Days, after killing two I.R.A. men after a false surrender.

  Now on reading the Mr Haines script I was shocked to read that the script supports the British accusation of mutilation after death except that instead of using hatchets and axes the I.R.A. used bayonets to mutilate the corpses. This is as false as the British accusation. Also the statement that the men of No. 2 section had to be physically restrained by me is is (sic) entirely contrary to fact as when I reached them they were stunned and shocked as men behind that rock were dead. Indeed it was because of the stunned condition of this that the Column was drilled on the road.

  Again, there were only two bayonets in the whole Column and they were held by Nyhan and Herlihy both of which were close to me at the Command post and on the road throughout the whole action.

  Now Dan, there are many more incorrect statements, but I am not prepared to discuss a single one of them until this part is rectified. It is untrue and a libel on my dead comrades.

  Finally I am aware that this presentation is an R.T.E. drama and a certain amount of licence is unavoidable, but most certainly not this.[52]

  The drama never came to fruition.

  From the British perspective there are three ‘official’ reports – each different in parts.[53]

  Peter Hart suggests that there was no false surrender based to some extent on an ‘after action report’ in the Strickland Papers that allegedly Tom Barry ‘The Rebel Commandant’ wrote and that was captured later.[54]Peter Hart chooses the absence of the mention of a false surrender in this report to say that there was no false surrender, yet he accepts that there was a surrender, despite this omission also in the report.[55]

  On the Sunday night (past midnight/early morning) Charlie Hurley, brigade commandant, heard of the day’s events from Tom Barry as they talked into the night.[56]It was Tuesday when Charlie Hurley got to brigade headquarters and told Liam Deasy all that had happened at Kilmichael – including the news of his brother’s death (Pat) and that of two more Volunteers.[57]

  Following the ambush, word soon circulated in the area that the Auxiliaries had participated in a false surrender. Imperial activist and writer, Lionel Curtis in early 1921 wrote:

  Last autumn a party of police was ambushed at Kilmichael, near Cork. Every member of the party but one was killed, and the bodies were shamefully mutilated. It is alleged by Sinn Féin that a white flag was put up by the police, and that when the attacking party approached to accept the surrender, fire was opened upon them.

  Curtis wasn’t sure of ‘the truth’ of t
his ‘notorious episode’ but said it ‘was obtained from a trustworthy source in the district.’ He was critical of ‘the absence of strict discipline’ in the Auxiliary force and stated that after the ‘next provocation’ came the burning of Cork – ‘started by men in the crown forces’.[58]

  Piaras Béaslaí wrote in 1926: ‘what really happened on the occasion was that after the fight had continued for some time, some of the Auxiliaries offered to surrender. When Volunteers advanced to take the surrender they were fired on.’ Béaslaí notes that among the party of Auxiliaries ‘of whom one, left for dead ... survived to tell the tale ... the tale the survivor told was full of falsehoods and gross misrepresentations. For instance, he asserted that all of the Auxiliaries took them for a party of English soldiers – a ridiculous fable – and he [Forde] absurdly exaggerated the numbers of the attackers.’

  Ernie O’Malley, a recorder of events of the time [1936], wrote that ‘the cadets’ had ‘killed some of the men who went out to take their surrender, and the column men wiped out the rest of them’.

  John McCann [1946] wrote: ‘Barry gave the cease fire order. As he did his men rose … [and] the Auxiliaries again opened fire.’[59]

  In the British record, the ‘Rebel Commandant’s report on the affair’ is undated and typed with quotation marks into an official record. Furthermore, it was typed after the Truce because the military’s own follow-up report, in the same document, mentions Barry as being ‘afterwards appointed liaison officer’. Basic elements point to a forgery. Most of the sentences contain elements that are at variance with written versions and also with that of participants’ information.[60]

  Here is what they call ‘the Rebel Commandant’s report on the affair’:

  The column paraded at 3.15 a.m. on Sunday morning. It comprised 32 men armed with rifles, bayonets, five revolvers, and 100 rounds of ammunition per man. We marched for four hours, and reached a position on the Macroom-Dunmanway road in the townland of Shanacashel. We camped in that position until 4.15 p.m., and then decided that as the enemy searches were completed, that it would be safe to return to our camp. Accordingly, we started the return journey. About five minutes after the start we sighted two enemy lorries moving along the Macroom-Dunmanway road at a distance of about 1,900 yards from us. The country in that particular district is of a hilly and rocky nature, and, although suitable to fighting, it is not at all suitable to retiring without being seen. I decided to attack the lorries. The action was carried out in the following manner:

  I divided the column into three sections, viz: one to attack the first lorry. This section was in a position to have ample cover, and at the same time to bring a frontal and flank fire to bear on the enemy. The second section was in a position about 120 yards from the first section, and at the same side of the road. Its duty was to let the first lorry pass to No. 1 section and to attack the second lorry. The third section was occupying sniping positions along the other side of the road, and also guarding both flanks. The action was carried out successfully. Sixteen of the enemy who were belonging to the Auxiliary Police from Macroom Castle being killed, one wounded and escaped, and is now missing.

  The captures were as follows … [it lists them] and two lorries, which were subsequently burnt.

  Our casualties were:

  One killed, and two who have subsequently died of wounds.

  O.C. Flying Column,

  3rd Cork Brigade.

  P.S.: I attribute our casualties to the fact that those three men (who were part of No. 2 section) were too anxious to get into close quarters with the enemy. They were our best men, and did not know danger in this or any previous actions. They discarded their cover, and it was not until the finish of the action that P. Deasy was killed by a revolver bullet from one of the enemy whom he thought dead.

  Typed after this report is: ‘The true facts are as follows …’ then the official version is given (see above p. 65, 66).[61]

  Peter Hart in his book states: ‘That this is an authentic captured document seems unquestionable.’ In correspondence to the Irish Times in 1998 a number of people sought to tease out the contents of ‘the Rebel Commandant’s report’, whether it was authentic and whether or not there was a false surrender at Kilmichael.[62]

  Dr Brian Murphy put the alleged report into a time frame. After the ambush (28 November 1920) Barry with the column was at the camp at Granure, south of Kilmichael when Charlie Hurley got ‘a verbal report’ from Barry in the early morning hours. The next few days found the column trying to evade the enemy. Barry was in hospital from 3 to 28 December 1920. ‘In this context questions arise as to the need to make a report, and the opportunity to do so ... One cannot but feel that far more evidence is required before Barry’s account [in his articles, book and broadcasts] may be dismissed as “lies and evasions”.’[63]

  (In a lecture to UCG history students when mentioning the late arrival to the ambush site of the horse and side car, Tom Barry said, ‘there was a mistake in transmission. No orders or anything else were written at that time – in our brigade anyway.’)[64]

  ‘IRA column men were well aware of the dangers of correspondence being captured: Tom Barry and Seán Moylan had a deep contempt for what they regarded as “pen pushers” in the command structure. Their emphasis was on action, not paperwork and with that went the conviction that they were fighting the war where it mattered.’[65]

  If Tom Barry wrote this report for his superiors, he would surely have the number of men under his command correct. The first sentence in this report has the time of arrival at the ambush site incorrect (important to Barry, always a stickler for time); the second sentence has ‘32 men’ instead of the correct 36 men. That sentence also mentions ‘100 rounds of ammunition per man’. With that amount Barry could have stormed Macroom Castle! In the early 1970s speaking to an audience in Cork he said, ‘We had only 30 to 36 rounds per man throughout the period, and this would last only one to one and half hours no matter how you would conserve it.’[66]

  They travelled for five and a quarter hours not ‘four hours’ as given in the third sentence.

  The report (allegedly Barry’s) states that the column ‘camped in that position until 4.15 p.m.’ and ‘we started the return journey. About five minutes after the start we sighted two enemy lorries ... I decided to attack the lorries ... I divided the column into three sections …’ (a) The facts are that the column remained in position. If the column had moved off, how could any commander get his men into the sections and a sub-section and be so well positioned to instantly take on the enemy? Why would Barry write that he had moved off when he hadn’t, as in doing so, he would have been condemning himself by engaging the enemy from an unprepared position? Why suggest that ‘the ambush was an accident’ so that he ‘could stay in charge’, as Peter Hart has stated.[67]If Barry meant to impress fellow officers, then from a guerrilla tactical viewpoint of preparedness, they would be foolish to leave him in charge. Furthermore, he couldn’t have pretended that the ambush was fought in any way other than as it happened, because on the morning after the ambush, Charlie Hurley, brigade OC spoke to the men ‘with praise of the military spirit in which the whole operation was carried out ... He went round to each individual member of the column, and in his own humble, quiet way encouraged him, thanked him for the honour he had brought to the brigade.’[68]

  Moreover, all other accounts of the ambush throughout the years, regardless of the teller, state that the men were in situ and followed Barry’s action orders. Despite this, Peter Hart in a letter to the Irish Times has endeavoured to justify why Barry ‘would lie about whether or not the ambush was planned … I believe Barry’s omission and lies form a coherent pattern in that they eliminate the controversial aspects of the event. He didn’t have authority to launch a risky ambush outside brigade boundaries, and he hadn’t told his superiors, so he claimed it was an accident.’[69]However, Liam Deasy and Charlie Hurley had visited the training camp. According to Liam Deasy, they were aware tha
t ‘Tom Barry’s scheme to ambush the Auxiliaries who were making incursions into our brigade area from Macroom had been maturing.’[70]Though Cork No. 1 Brigade was planning ‘a big scheme’ attack on the Macroom Auxiliaries, they were ‘happy’ with Barry’s coup.[71]

  (b) There is no mention in the ‘Rebel Commandant’s report’ of the sub-section nor the manned command post, each an important device by Barry. Why would Barry omit this important tactic, which was far more important than describing the terrain?

  (c) The ambush lasted approximately twenty minutes. This alleged report has the ambush starting around the time the engagement was over. Barry would have got the time correct. (‘One of Barry’s mannerisms was that he constantly kept his eye on the time’.)[72]

  Some of the terminology in this report (allegedly Barry’s) has all the aspects of one written from the Auxiliary barrack viewpoint:

  (a) ‘We camped in that position.’ They didn’t camp. They got into ambush positions, which is what Barry would have said.

  (b) ‘ ... and then decided that as the enemy searches were completed.’ Barry would have used the words ‘raids’ or ‘rampages.’ The barrack would have used ‘searches’. In one British report they were going ‘in search of a wanted man’. Barry was aware from previous experience that there was no completion to their ‘raids’. He later told Nollaig Ó Gadhra, ‘about 4 o’clock I had my mind made up they weren’t coming, and I decided I would give them another ten minutes. Surely at five past four they sailed into us!’[73]

  (c) ‘One wounded and escaped and is now missing.’ Barry’s men told him that one escaped, how did he know whether or not he was ‘now missing’? In Macroom Castle they knew he was ‘now missing’! In their official report they listed Cadet Guthrie as ‘missing’.

  (d) ‘Sixteen of the enemy … being killed’, this report states. If Barry counted properly there were seventeen on the road – all, he believed, dead. In the British report which follows Barry’s alleged report (in this typewritten document) it states that ‘of the party of eighteen, sixteen were found lying dead on the spot one had disappeared’ and ‘one left for dead’.[74]The first official report has sixteen dead, ‘one wounded’, and ‘one missing’. Two subsequent official reports contain ‘sixteen members of the Macroom Auxiliary Police … only one of the sixteen escaped … missing.’[75]